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Negative “GHIs,” the Right to Health Protection, and Future Generations 
 
Abstract: The argument has been made that future generations of human beings are 
being harmed unjustifiably by the actions individuals commit today. This paper 
addresses what it might mean to harm future generations, whether we might harm 
them, and what our duties toward future generations might be. After introducing the 
“Global Health Impact” (GHI) concept as a unit of measurement that evaluates the 
effects of human actions on the health of all organisms, an incomplete theory of human 
justice is proposed. Having shown that the negative GHIs of our current generation 
cause unfair harm to future generations, I argue that each human being must be 
allocated a fair threshold of negative GHIs that should not be exceeded. By emphasising 
the need to consider all the GHIs of human actions, the theory of human justice 
developed here is highly relevant to evaluate human actions that might affect future 
generations, for example those related to climate change. 
 
Key words: bioethics, ethics, global, health, future generations 
 
 3 
Negative “GHIs,” the Right to Health Protection, and Future Generations 
Introduction 
While many bioethicists have traditionally focused on relationships between patients 
and health care providers in abstraction from their wider context, it has been argued 
that there is an urgent need for bioethics to broaden its horizon by addressing how the 
needs and interests of individuals must be weighed in the balance with those of the 
larger public, including members of future generations, as well as with the organisms 
that make up the nonhuman world (Ehrlich 2009). In some situations, the harms 
associated with decisions that are made by individuals might not or hardly affect them, 
while they might affect many others. Examples are activities that potentially contribute 
to the health risks associated with climate change or the emergence and spread of 
zoonoses. In some situations, the harms that are associated with present activities may 
not manifest themselves until much later. Dale Jamieson, however, has claimed that 
“the costs of present lifestyles are currently pushed on to future generations” (2008, 
203), and that this is immoral. If the empirical evidence on which Jamieson relies is 
correct, the fact that we fail to consider adequately both human and nonhuman beings 
of the future suggests that we might lack clear ideas about whether or not we might 
harm those who will live in the future, how we might harm them, and what our 
responsibilities toward them might be.  
The concept of “Global Health Impact” (GHI) can be used as a unit of 
measurement to evaluate the effects of human actions on human health, as well as on 
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nonhuman others, and this concept is useful for shedding light on the question of how 
we might benefit or harm others and for determining what our responsibilities might be. 
An incomplete theory of justice, then, can be created based on GHIs. The adjective 
“incomplete” is applied here for two distinct reasons. First, only our duties toward 
human beings are considered, with a particular focus on our duties toward future 
generations. Second, only negative duties (to avoid harming or disadvantaging others) 
are considered, and the question of what our positive duties to promote human 
flourishing might be is ignored. These restrictions are essential for developing a theory 
that is likely to appeal to a wide range of people, including strong anthropocentric 
libertarians who dismiss the view that we have strong duties toward nonhuman others 
and reject the existence of positive duties (Huseby 2008, 13).  
After introducing the GHI concept, some evidence will be provided to support 
the view that the total negative GHIs of our present generation harm future generations 
unjustifiably. Consequently, the argument is made that our present generation is under 
a moral obligation to limit its negative GHIs, and that this obligation must be borne 
primarily by those who exceed their fair share of negative GHIs. In this way, it will be 
argued that even strong anthropocentric libertarians should accept the existence of 
significant duties toward future generations. Even though objections to this view exist—
namely, growth, risk, and collective action discounting views—it will be argued that 
none of these survives ethical scrutiny.     
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The “GHI” concept 
Every moral theory must include some account of which things should be valued. In the 
capabilities approach, proposed originally by Amartya Sen (1993) and developed by 
Martha Nussbaum (2004), moral duties toward humans originate from the recognition 
that humans possess capabilities to flourish, the functioning of which either should be 
promoted or at least not be hindered unfairly. A necessary condition for an action to 
harm human others unfairly is that its consequences undermine the possibilities for 
others to enjoy their capabilities. While Sen is vague about what these capabilities are, 
Nussbaum has identified ten human capabilities. These are: life; bodily health; bodily 
integrity; senses, imagination, and thought; emotions; practical reason; affiliation; (a 
relationship with) other species; play; and political and material control over one’s 
environment (Nussbaum 2006, 76). Nussbaum (2004) also has argued that many 
nonhuman organisms possess some capabilities and that we must consider how we 
might safeguard or promote these capabilities in our dealings with nonhuman life. While 
Nussbaum asserts human rights as important, her moral theory nevertheless focuses on 
capabilities, which she distinguishes from rights. A different approach is adopted by 
Simon Caney, who emphasises the human rights that should be protected or promoted 
when human beings make decisions about how to act. For example, in his discussion of 
rights in relation to climate change, he argues that climate change threatens various 
human rights, including the right to life, the right to subsistence, the right to health care, 
the right to property, and the right not to be subject to enforced relocation (Caney 
2009, 167).  
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While Nussbaum’s inclusion of nonhuman organisms within the sphere of justice 
is endorsed, the approach presented here is a theory of rights, and the argument will be 
made that the fundamental defendum of both capabilities and rights theories should be 
the same thing. I share Caney’s view, moreover, which is based on the “interest theory” 
of rights proposed by Joseph Raz (1986), that human rights “are justified on the grounds 
that they protect vital human interests that are sufficient to generate duties on others” 
(2009, 167). An issue that has been the subject of considerable debate is the question of 
whether future generations have rights. Related to this issue is the “non-identity” 
problem, or the difficulty of conceiving how non-overlapping future generations could 
be harmed (by potential rights violations) if the people belonging to those generations 
would not have existed had the supposedly harmful activities not occurred (Parfit 1987, 
part 4). The belief that the people who might be born if we avoid certain activities today 
would be different from the people who might be born if we do not avoid them seems 
plausible. On this basis, the claim has been made that we cannot ascribe rights to future 
generations and, therefore, cannot violate their rights either (Broome 1992, 33): If 
violating someone’s rights means causing them to be worse off than they would have 
been otherwise, those individuals who will belong to our future generations cannot be 
made worse off by our activities. This stems from the fact that they will not be brought 
into existence unless we commit ourselves to carrying out those activities. However, this 
understanding of harm and of rights has been challenged by William Fitzpatrick, who 
argues convincingly that it is possible to harm someone even if we are unsure about the 
identity of the person who might experience harm—as harming someone need not be 
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understood in terms of making someone worse off relative to some earlier condition 
(2007, 382–383). Fitzpatrick adds that “an action can turn out to have violated a 
person’s rights without its having been the case at the time of acting that there was any 
right constraining the agent from so acting” (2007, 384, italics in the original). Similarly, 
Derek Bell (2011) has argued that future generations can be harmed if our activities 
result in future generations being forced to live in conditions that put them below a 
certain threshold of a good that is protected by a right. On this basis, it can be 
concluded that it is quite appropriate to speak of the rights of future generations.   
In addition to human rights, a theory of justice also must consider what our 
duties are toward the nonhuman world. Indeed, whether we think in terms of 
capabilities or in terms of interests, many ethicists have argued that there are at least 
some nonhuman organisms that possess either capabilities or interests and that humans 
have at least some duties toward parts of the nonhuman world on the basis of these 
(Nussbaum 2004; Taylor 1986). At the same time, since the capabilities and interests of 
nonhuman organisms are different from those of humans, it is clear that the things we 
need to consider when we deal with the question of what we owe the nonhuman world 
are different from the things we must consider regarding our duties toward human 
beings. For example, humans do not appear to have as strong an interest in being able 
to climb trees compared to chimpanzees. Therefore, it is plausible to assume that we 
have a stronger duty to protect a chimpanzee’s interest in climbing trees than that of a 
human being’s. 
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In spite of these differences, the view—adopted by Paul Taylor (1986, 110)— 
that all living organisms have an interest in health is adopted here and it is added that 
health should be the only thing that matters when we consider our moral duties in 
relation to living beings. Health, however, is a value that cannot be guaranteed; 
therefore, this translates into a right to health care, rather than a right to health. 
Whereas such a narrow focus might be perceived to fail to do justice to the other 
capabilities, interests, or rights we should consider, the contention is made here that all 
the other capabilities and rights discussed by Nussbaum and Caney, respectively, are 
important precisely because they contribute to the value of a healthy or flourishing life. 
In this respect, it is worth mentioning that the concept of “flourishing” is repeated in 
Nussbaum’s writings, suggesting that the fulfilment of these capabilities is what 
provides for a “flourishing life” or a healthy life (2000, 88; 2004).1 Likewise, when we 
consider human rights, it could be said that the aforementioned rights to subsistence, 
property, and freedom from enforced relocation, as well as other rights that appear to 
be quite different from the right to health care (for example, the rights to free speech or 
privacy), are important because they contribute to a healthy human life. Whereas it can 
be meaningful to speak of a plurality of capabilities and interests in specific contexts, it 
also is useful to aggregate these into a single metric. On this account, bioethics—or the 
study of how we ought to act or refrain from acting in relation to living organisms—
essentially should be about health protection and health promotion. Therefore, when 
we consider the moral quality of any particular action that might harm or benefit living 
organisms, we must assess its potential health impacts.  
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GHIs provide a tool to capture and evaluate the moral quality of human actions 
vis-à-vis the living world within one unit by focusing on health. Adding the word 
“Global” to that of “Health Impact” emphasises three things. First, it highlights the view 
that the concept of health should be understood broadly when we assess the health 
impacts of our (proposed) actions—i.e., a holistic understanding of health, 
encapsulating all things that are conducive to human and nonhuman flourishing. 
Second, it acts as a reminder that the consequences of our actions upon the health of 
the global population of human beings should be considered, including those who are 
more remote in space, and even upon global humanity, which is understood to include 
those who are more remote in time. And third, it refers to the need to consider the 
effects of our actions upon the nonhuman organisms that live on our globe.  
 
Negative GHIs and our negative duties to future generations 
An important issue for any theory of justice is the determination of our negative duties. 
Thomas Pogge has defined a negative duty as a “duty to ensure that others are not 
unduly harmed (or wronged) through one’s own conduct” (2002, 130). This can be 
articulated as a duty to make sure that “others are not unduly harmed” through the 
negative GHIs produced by one’s actions. While the production of some (quantities of) 
negative GHIs may not be problematic, the production of some other (quantities of) 
negative GHIs may be questionable; for example, if it would jeopardize the human right 
to health protection. Thus, the question remains: Do the negative GHIs of our current 
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generation cause unfair harm to future generations of human beings and, if so, what 
does this imply for us today? The work of Simon Caney and Derek Bell on the ethics of 
climate change offers some possible answers.  
Drawing on Raz’s (1986) “interest theory” of rights, Caney starts from the 
premise that (1) “a person has a right to X when X is a fundamental interest that is 
weighty enough to impose obligations on others” (2006, 259). He then argues that some 
interests are not sufficiently important to impose duties on others and, therefore, 
cannot ground rights. Vital or fundamental interests, by contrast, would be important 
enough to establish rights. Second, Caney argues that (2) “global climate change 
damages persons’ fundamental interests” (2006, 259). To substantiate this claim, he 
suggests that humans have fundamental interests in a range of things, including health, 
food, water, and housing, and he refers to scientific evidence to support the view that 
these interests are already and will continue to be jeopardised by climate change. Critics 
might object that, while these interests are important, they are not sufficiently 
important to ground rights. Caney’s response is that they are “key to all persons” and 
that the duties associated with protecting these interests are “not unreasonably 
demanding” (2008, 538–539). Moreover, even if some activities that contribute to 
climate change (e.g., burning fossil fuels to keep ourselves warm) protect our 
fundamental interests and curtailing those activities would require unjustifiably large 
sacrifices, Caney counters that the reason we are currently confronted with dangerous 
climate change relates to the fact that some people prioritize their own “relatively 
trivial” interests over the fundamental interests of others (2006, 263). This leads him to 
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conclude that (3) “persons have a right not to suffer from the ill-effects associated with 
global climate change” (Caney 2006, 263). 
Revisiting the evidence Caney presents to ground this claim is beyond the scope 
of this paper. However, it must be noted that problems of scale, such as climate change, 
would not exist in a world with far fewer people, even if they pursued many relatively 
trivial interests. Such problems, then, could be reduced either by limiting our population 
or by limiting consumption and pollution. As there is no downward trend in the world’s 
population, at some future point it might no longer be possible to satisfy all the interests 
we now consider vital, particularly if we fail to take stronger action. Therefore, in order 
to prevent an erosion of the category of fundamental interests (and their associated 
rights), the duty to refrain from pursuing some relatively trivial interests comprises not 
only a duty to abstain from excessive consumption, but also a duty to abstain from 
excessive procreation.  
Regarding a more general theory of human justice, Caney’s conclusion may be 
modified to the view that (4) others have a right not to suffer from significant health 
costs produced by another’s activities that serve relatively trivial interests. This could be 
called a right to health protection. The need to generalise Caney’s theory follows 
logically from the fact that this right can be jeopardized not only by the actions one 
individual undertakes to satisfy his or her trivial interests where these contribute to 
dangerous climate change, but by a wide range of negative GHIs that could be produced 
by the things an individual might do to fulfil those trivial interests. An example is the 
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negative GHIs associated with using a particular resource to satisfy trivial interests, 
whereby others are denied access to this resource to satisfy their right to health 
protection. While many human activities produce both positive and negative GHIs, the 
overall GHIs of any activity that serves trivial interests should never be allowed to 
jeopardize any human being’s right to health protection, even in situations where many 
people could obtain relatively trivial positive GHIs at the expense of one person’s right 
to health protection. 
The negative GHIs produced by our present generation (5) undermine the 
conditions suitable to safeguard the right to health protection of future generations. 
This is an empirical premise supported by the Millennium Assessment of Ecosystems 
and Human Wellbeing, a large study aimed at examining the effects of ecosystem 
changes on human health (Reid et al. 2005). It concludes that the benefits future 
generations will be able to receive from ecosystems will be reduced significantly unless 
we take urgent, much more drastic action to curtail the rapid degradation of ecosystems 
that is caused by the growth in consumption and pollution of the expanding human 
population (Reid et al. 2005). Two examples of issues that cause significant concern are 
climate change and the growth of the farm animal sector. With regard to the former, 
the fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
reveals that, relative to the third Assessment Report, “there is now higher confidence in 
the projected increases in droughts, heat waves and floods” (IPCC 2007b, 19). Evidence 
also indicates that “specific groups, such as the poor and elderly” will be more 
vulnerable and that “low-latitude and less developed areas generally face greater risk” 
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(IPCC 2007b, 19). A range of health risks, including heat wave impacts, diseases 
associated with exposure to high concentrations of air pollutants, diarrheal diseases, 
and flood-related health risks are expected to increase (Schneider et al. 2007, 791; IPCC 
2007a, 27). As agricultural production likely will decrease in some areas, low-latitude 
countries are expected to experience reduced food security and increased malnutrition 
(Schneider et al. 2007, 781, 787, 791). Between 5 and 170 million people are expected 
(with medium confidence) to be “at risk of hunger by the 2080s as a consequence of 
climate change” (Schneider et al. 2007, 791; see also Schmidhuber and Tubiello 2007). 
With regard to the farm animal sector, some of its negative GHIs have been 
documented in a report with the title “Livestock’s Long Shadow,” published by the 
Livestock, Environment, and Development Initiative, a group coordinated by the Food 
and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (Steinfeld et al. 2006). It claims that 
the “sector enters into more and direct competition for scarce land, water and other 
natural resources” and that “the environmental impact of livestock production will 
worsen dramatically … in the absence of major corrective features” (Steinfeld et al. 
2006, xxi, 275). These environmental impacts include the unsustainable use of land and 
water resources, as well as negative impacts on air quality and atmospheric gas 
concentrations (especially those that contribute to climate change). Whereas it may not 
be immediately apparent how some of these might produce negative GHIs, there is no 
doubt that there is growing concern about the links between the sector and human 
disease, exemplified also by the rise in zoonoses, including swine flu (Woolhouse and 
Gowtage-Sequeira 2005). 
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The negative GHIs we must consider when we think about our negative duties 
toward future generations, however, are much more diverse than the negative GHIs 
associated with climate change and the farm animal sector. The ecological footprint 
concept can be usefully deployed to understand a wide range of negative GHIs 
associated with our activities (Wackernagel and Rees 1996). While the GHI concept 
measures the impact of human actions on the health of all biological organisms in one 
common unit, the concept of “ecological footprint” measures the impact of human 
activities on the nonhuman environment in one common unit: the use of bioproductive 
(biologically productive) space, or the quantity of biological resources that is used to 
provide for any particular human activity. While human health is affected by much more 
than by the use of bioproductive space, it has nevertheless been claimed that the 
ecological footprint is “the most comprehensive and most widely adopted overall 
measure of threats to environmental sustainability,” and this indicator has itself been 
understood as one of the most important ways to measure the impact of 
“environmental stressors” on human health (Dietz et al. 2009, 118). The notion of 
“ecological footprint” was coined in the 1990s by William Rees and Mathis Wackernagel 
(1996) and stands for the “amount of biologically productive land and water area an 
individual, a city, a country, a region, or all of humanity uses to produce the resources it 
consumes and to absorb the waste it generates under current technology and resource 
management practices” (Kitzes and Wackernagel 2009, 813; Rees 2003, 898). It is 
important to emphasize that only biological material and waste products are taken into 
consideration. The effects on biological systems of materials that are neither created 
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nor absorbed by biological processes, such as plastics, are included, but no ecological 
footprint is provided for these products themselves (Kitzes and Wackernagel 2009, 
814).2
Rees has calculated that there are only 1.8 hectares of biologically productive 
water and land per person on this planet, which is exceeded by the 2.2 hectares that are 
used by the average person living today. Since the global biocapacity or human carrying 
capacity is exceeded by more than 20 percent, Rees (2003; 2006) therefore concludes 
that the world is in “overshoot” as biological resources are consumed at a faster rate 
than the rate by which they can be replenished.
  
3 Since most people living in affluent 
countries exceed the average amount of “global hectares”—the amount of land that is 
needed to produce any particular commodity that is consumed and to deal with its 
waste—available per person by a large margin, Rees concludes that “most so-called 
‘advanced’ countries are running massive unaccounted ecological deficits with the rest 
of the planet” (1996, 195). For example, the average ecological footprint of a citizen of 
the United Kingdom is 5.3 global hectares, or about three times the amount of 
biologically productive hectares that are available for each person in the world (Global 
Footprint Network 2008). Whereas the population of the United Kingdom is fairly 
stationary, there are other countries, for example the United States of America, that 
combine a large national ecological footprint with a significant increase in population, a 
very worrying combination (Ehrlich and Ehrlich 1997, 1198). 
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If we assume Rees is correct regarding this overshoot, we are faced with the 
question of not only what overshooting countries should do to reduce their ecological 
deficit, but also how many resources and how much waste each of us should be allowed 
toconsume and produce, respectively, and how many children we should be allowed to 
have, without jeopardising the right to health protection of others unfairly.  To address 
this issue, ecological footprint calculators that gauge the footprints of individuals can be 
used. On the other hand, while the ecological footprint is a fairly inclusive measure, it is 
an inadequate tool to evaluate the moral character of human actions: while some 
activities may use relatively few resources and produce little waste, they might 
nevertheless undermine human and nonhuman health. An example would be killing 
someone, which might be considered positive if our sole aim was to reduce the 
ecological footprint of the entire human population. Therefore, a relatively large 
negative GHI need not be associated with a relatively large ecological footprint. 
Likewise, a relatively large ecological footprint need not be associated with a relatively 
large negative GHI. Compare, for example, the ecological footprint of a factory that 
produces shoes at a greater ecological footprint per shoe compared to a factory that 
produces shoes at a smaller ecological footprint. Should the former produce shoes that 
are significantly better for human health, for example by reducing bacterial infections, 
its average GHI per shoe produced might be more positive. In summary, if the ecological 
footprint is an important indicator of environmental stress on human health, there is 
reason to scrutinise whether those with relatively large individual ecological footprints 
might violate any human being’s right to health protection.  
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Whether the negative GHIs produced by our present generation undermine the 
right to health protection of future generations may remain open to debate; however, if 
the validity of this premise is assumed, Caney’s partial theory of intergenerational 
justice can be extrapolated to make the claim that (6) the negative GHIs of our present 
generation must be reduced to a fair level. Similarly, a commitment to intra-
generational justice supports the view that (7) each person must be allocated a fair 
share of negative GHIs that should not be exceeded.4
While the ecological footprint provides a quantifiable measure, a similar 
calculator has not been developed yet for the GHI concept. Regardless, the GHI concept 
is useful, and we perhaps should seek a means for quantification. It is impossible to say 
categorically that those who produce relatively large amounts of greenhouse gas 
emissions or those who have relatively large ecological footprints act immorally. In 
order to evaluate the morality of our actions, we must consider the negative and 
positive GHIs that might be produced by them, allowing ourselves to be guided by the 
question of what we owe to every organism that possesses a right to health protection 
and promotion. The summation of a person’s negative and positive GHIs could then be 
expressed by means of a combined GHI value. Quantifying GHIs would be particularly 
useful to evaluate the moral quality of those actions that might not be intrinsically 
wrong (e.g., travelling by plane), yet that would be wrong if done a number of times 
 Whether this is done by limiting 
procreation, by using public instead of private transport, by changing one’s diet, or by 
limiting one’s water consumption, what matters is that negative GHIs are restricted, 
rather than how this is achieved.  
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and/or for reasons that are insufficiently good. As for ecological footprints, it must be 
emphasised that a fair share of negative GHIs does not mean an equal share. Some 
people might justifiably be allowed to produce a relatively larger share of negative GHIs 
than others, not because their interests would be more important, but because more 
negative GHIs might need to be produced to fulfil the positive GHIs associated with their 
interests. For example, to keep themselves warm, people who live in colder climates 
might claim that they should be allowed to produce more greenhouse gas emissions 
than those who live in warmer climates. This is justifiable where they need to burn more 
fossil fuels, at least in situations where it would not be reasonable to expect them to use 
alternative modes of heating that would produce fewer emissions or to relocate. Some 
variations in diet-related negative GHIs must also be tolerated to account for the fact 
that people live in different environments, rely on different foods, and may have 
different metabolic demands. The fact that people live in a wide range of environments 
also could be used to justify the view that some people should, ceteris paribus, be 
allowed to reproduce more compared to others, for example where this would be 
necessary to provide sufficient labour. And, some variations in job-related negative GHIs 
must also be tolerated, not because some people would be excused from jeopardising 
others’ rights, but because some of their negative GHIs might be offset by the relatively 
greater amount of positive GHIs that their actions produce for others. For example, it 
may be advantageous to allow those who can use substances that produce greenhouse 
gases in more efficient ways (e.g., because they have developed better technologies) a 
greater share of greenhouse gas emissions if the positive GHIs that are thus produced 
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are conferred to others (such as a large factory owner who, ceteris paribus, uses energy 
more efficiently to produce shoes than the amount of energy smaller factories would 
need to produce an equal number of shoes). 
Because a theory of negative GHIs focuses on the right to health protection, it is 
consequentialist—the morality of human actions is decided by assessing the 
consequences, measured in terms of whether the associated negative GHIs jeopardise 
others’ interests in health protection—and not utilitarian. Actions that sacrifice the right 
to health protection that we should grant to every human being, including those who 
belong to future generations, are not acceptable, even if they promote the health of 
some. A more complete theory would need to include an assessment of how much 
moral weight should be given to human interests in health promotion up to and beyond 
a minimum threshold of health care and to the interests of nonhuman organisms in 
health protection and promotion. While no precise answer has been provided to the 
question of what should count as a fair share of negative GHIs, there can be little doubt 
that many people are under a moral obligation to curtail their negative GHIs if they take 
the right to health protection of all human beings, including those who will belong to 
future generations, seriously. Future generations of human beings will have a 
fundamental interest in adequate health protection. If the view that valuing their like 
interests as much as our own interests is morally justified, it is unfair for people living 
today to jeopardize their rights to health protection.  
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Objections and refutations 
Considered here are three objections to this conclusion. A first objection stems from 
those who support the legitimacy of what Nordhaus has labelled as “growth 
discounting” (1997, 317). Since future generations might be able to use resources more 
efficiently, or find (the ability to use) new resources which will make them wealthier, the 
argument has been made that people who emit relatively large amounts of greenhouse 
gases should not necessarily restrict their emissions (Lomborg 2001, 314; Nordhaus and 
Boyer 1999). More generally, this would provide a reason why those who produce 
relatively large amounts of negative GHIs that would be unfair if future generations did 
not become wealthier should not be obliged to reduce their negative GHIs. This 
proposal is subject to several problems.  
First, the claim that future generations will be wealthier is highly speculative, 
whereas it is highly likely that they will need more financial and other resources to deal 
with a wide range of negative GHIs that current generations have contributed. For 
example, the IPCC estimates with “high confidence” (which is defined in terms of an 80 
percent chance) that some of the health benefits associated with climate change will be 
outweighed by the negative impacts, including “increased malnutrition,” an increase in 
“the number of people suffering from death, disease and injury from heatwaves, floods 
storms, fires and droughts,” and increased “cardiorespiratory morbidity and mortality” 
(Confalonieri et al. 2007, 393; IPCC 2007a, 27, 48). If some of these negative GHIs 
materialise, there can be little doubt that their financial and other resources would be 
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compromised. Even if we assume that nobody will be affected by any of these negative 
outcomes, a well-known report by Nicholas Stern (2006) claims that the costs of dealing 
with climate change now are smaller than the costs of dealing with it later. If this is 
correct, more resources will be required the longer it takes to develop an appropriate 
global framework, whether or not future generations will be wealthier. 
Second, the objection fails to recognise that the possibility that future 
generations may not be harmed unfairly is not a necessary condition for the argument 
that positive action to reduce our negative GHIs is required. What it ignores is that the 
lifestyles of many people with relatively large negative GHIs may not only be 
problematic because of their consequences for future generations, but also because 
they already affect, in adverse ways, people who live today. Regarding climate change, 
the IPCC reports that there have already been human deaths attributable to climate 
change and that there is “very high confidence” that people living on many islands and 
in polar regions have already been adversely affected by climate change (Schneider et 
al. 2007, 781; IPCC 2007a, 33). Some of the adverse effects that these as well as other 
populations have experienced (including increases in water- and vector-borne diseases) 
have been documented recently by anthropologists Hans Baer and Merrill Singer, who 
present a wealth of evidence that those who have been and will be affected the worst 
by climate change are predominantly those populations who are marginalised already 
(Baer and Singer 2009, 15). The Millennium Assessment of Ecosystems and Human 
Wellbeing has reached a similar conclusion: “The changes that have been made to 
ecosystems have contributed to … the exacerbation of poverty for some groups of 
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people” (Reid et al. 2005, 1). Likewise, philosopher Peter Singer has claimed that, based 
on his assessment of the available evidence, “the greenhouse gas emissions of the 
industrialized nations have harmed, and are continuing to harm, many of the world’s 
poorest people—along with many richer ones, too” (2009, 33).  
Third, the argument that a later generation should deal with a problem that was 
created by an earlier generation simply because they are assumed to be wealthier 
clashes with the intuition behind the “polluter pays” principle. This point has been made 
poignantly by Caney: “If, for example, I leave rubbish in the street then, ceteris paribus, I 
have primary responsibility to clear it up—not some other actor who happens to have 
more wealth than me” (2009, 172).  
A second objection stems from the perception that there is a morally relevant 
difference between activities such as littering and some other human activities that 
might produce negative GHIs, such as those related to greenhouse gases. It would be 
appropriate to give greater moral consideration to activities that pose almost certain 
threats to human interests than to activities that may be less likely to produce negative 
GHIs. For example, it could be argued that those who litter, at least if they do so in many 
public spaces, or those who steal, are almost certain to undermine the interests of other 
people, while it is less certain that those who produce negative GHIs by emitting 
greenhouse gases will harm others, who would therefore be at less risk. We might call 
this objection—discussed in a paper by Derek Bell (2011)—the “risk discounting” view. 
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In response to this “risk problem,” Bell (2011) has argued that if we are serious 
about human rights, we should not only be concerned with certain violations of those 
rights (in which case—incidentally—action would be deferred until the violations had 
actually occurred), but also with what Henry Shue has called “predictable remediable 
threats” (1980, 33). This raises the question of whether these potential violations might 
be preventable. On this issue, Bell (2011) and Caney (2008, 538–539) support the view 
adopted by the IPCC, namely that we can at least in part remedy the threat posed by 
climate change and that we can do so without jeopardising any human being’s vital 
interests. More generally, we should be concerned with all human activities that 
threaten to violate anyone’s right to health protection, rather than just with those 
activities where threats are virtually certain.  
A third objection starts from the view that any individual decision to forgo some 
activities that are associated with relatively large negative GHIs, such as reducing one’s 
greenhouse gas emissions, achieves very little in terms of reducing negative GHIs overall 
(e.g., the total amount of anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions) and therefore yields 
very little in terms of doing something about the associated human rights violations. On 
this basis, an objection could be made that, in the absence of appropriate policies to 
promote adequate collective action, nobody would have a duty to curtail his or her 
negative GHIs. We might label this the (severe) collective action discounting view, 
whereby moral priority is given to actions that do not require cooperation from others 
to produce positive or avoid negative effects. The collective action discounting objection 
might be based on recognition of either of the following two problems: The first is what 
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Bell (2011) has referred to as a problem of non-compliance; the second is the fact that it 
may not be clear what might be expected from us (i.e., no policy has been developed 
yet on what should count as a reasonable threshold of negative GHIs), what Bell deems 
a problem of allocation.  
With regard to the first issue, it is true that little is achieved by the efforts that 
some individuals may make to reduce their negative GHIs without positive action from a 
large section of the whole human population. Because of this “tragedy of the commons” 
(Hardin 1968), collective action is required in order for positive actions to have 
substantial effects. Without collective decisions, people who voluntarily decide to curtail 
their negative GHIs might argue that they pay the costs for doing so by forgoing some of 
the positive GHIs that are associated with them, while others may grab hold of the 
opportunities they forgo or reap the benefits of living in a world with less negative GHIs 
overall. Indeed, it has been pointed out that, in a situation wherein a large share of the 
benefits of any particular optimal strategy would not manifest themselves until the 
present generation is no longer around (as with global climate change), the best 
collective decision from a shallow, self-interested perspective is for the whole present 
generation to avoid the adoption of such a strategy (Gardiner 2001, 403–404). The 
possibility that individual efforts may have little effect since others might defect, 
however, does not provide a legitimate excuse for non-compliance. Rather, “if we take 
human rights seriously and we expect some people not to comply with the duty not to 
personally violate human rights, then we should recognise a duty to promote effective 
institutions for the protection of human rights” (Bell 2011). It should be added that the 
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same should be said about any rights, including the rights that nonhuman organisms 
might possess.  
With regard to the second problem, there may be wide social disagreement on 
what  should count as GHIs as well as on how we can establish reliable knowledge about 
the GHIs that might be associated with human activities (for example, in relation to 
scientific uncertainties about the effects of increasing the concentration of greenhouse 
gas emissions into our atmosphere). On the other hand, if we take human rights 
seriously and no correlative duties have been specified and allocated, then we must 
create new or tweak existing institutions to specify as well as allocate duties (Bell 
2011).5
Policy-makers might decide that the production of some negative GHIs by some 
activities is so bad that they should be prohibited, as is the case already for some actions 
(for example, killing a human being without good reason). For other negative GHIs, 
systems could be put into place to try to ensure these stay within fair limits, either by 
limiting negative GHIs or by offsetting them through the production of positive GHIs. 
 Broadening this issue to establish what Hardin (1968) called a system of “mutual 
coercion” that is “mutually agreed upon,” each of us has a duty to contribute to the 
creation of (inter)national institutions and (inter)national policies on what counts as a 
fair cap of negative GHIs and on how individual allowances should be allocated. Since 
many different parameters must be considered to determine what should count as a 
negative GHI, working together with others and drawing on a wide range of expertise 
also can develop our understanding of how our activities might produce negative GHIs.  
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This could be done either indirectly through taxation or directly through the 
development of strategies to make sure those who produce negative GHIs deal with the 
problems they produce themselves. In the former system, governments could raise and 
use GHI taxes to fund activities that produce positive GHIs in order to counterbalance 
the negative GHIs produced by the taxed activities. In the latter system, governments 
could force those who produce negative GHIs to offset these by producing positive GHIs. 
These options have been discussed elsewhere in relation to the policies we might 
develop to curtail the negative GHIs associated with the consumption of farmed animal 
products (Deckers 2010). In the interim, the fact that we lack a global political project to 
allocate and police negative GHI thresholds does not excuse us from the duty to make a 
fair contribution to the creation of such a project.  
Do individuals have a duty to curtail their negative GHIs in the absence of 
adequate policies? Given that those who adopt voluntary measures to curtail their 
negative GHIs may pay the price for doing so, the expectation that others will be free-
riders could foster the view that there is no specific duty to curtail negative GHIs. This 
view, however, is not persuasive (see, for example, Bell 2011). It is not because we are 
uncertain about the consequences of our actions or about whether others will adopt 
similar actions that we should not commit ourselves to adopting actions that accord 
with the demands of justice. The sheer fact that we need to develop policies does not 
provide an excuse for failing to decide personally how negative GHIs should be 
measured and constrained, how maximum thresholds of negative GHIs should be 
allocated, and how to live accordingly. If we do not make such decisions for ourselves, 
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we may enjoy lifestyles that produce more negative GHIs than the amount of negative 
GHIs that would be allowed if a theory of justice were agreed upon and implemented 
through regulations. In other words, we would be benefiting from our own and others’ 
unwillingness to contribute adequately to the creation of policies to constrain negative 
GHIs. To the extent that these violate the human right to health protection, we would 
be benefiting from human rights violations. If we take this right seriously, these 
violations are unacceptable. On this basis, Bell (2011) has argued in the context of a 
discussion of the ethics of climate change that each person must “reduce their 
greenhouse gas emissions to a level that they can reasonably believe would be 
consistent with the specification and allocation of duties by effective institutions.” Since 
some people’s emissions may be below that level, the word “reduce” should be 
replaced by “limit” to be accurate. Applying this rule to our more general concern with 
negative GHIs, it is clear we all have a duty to ensure we limit our negative GHIs to a 
threshold we think would be agreed to by just institutions. The duty to develop policies 
does not diminish the duty for each person to decide for himself or herself when an 
action might harm others unjustifiably.   
 
Conclusion 
The GHI concept is useful to throw light on the bioethical question of what our duties 
are toward future generations. Future generations of human beings have fundamental 
interests in health protection, and it should not be too demanding for us to safeguard 
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these interests. We can fulfil our negative duties if we fail to exceed our fair share of 
negative GHIs.  
There are some challenges and limitations to this argument that have not been 
discussed here. A baseline of human health care sufficient to ground a human right as 
well as what might count as a fair share of negative GHIs should be defined, and positive 
duties that contribute to health promotion should be explored. A further issue is the 
question of how the fundamental interests of nonhuman organisms should weigh in the 
balance with human interests. As argued elsewhere, even if the fundamental interests 
of other organisms are not as morally weighty as those of human organisms, many 
human beings nevertheless should severely reduce their negative GHIs to safeguard the 
rights of other animals, for example, by adopting minimal moral veganism (Deckers 
2011). A theory examining the moral significance of interests of nonhuman organisms is 
needed. In spite of these limitations, there are reasons to suspect that Jamieson (2008) 
may be right: the price of many current lifestyles is unfair on future generations. If they 
adopt the view that the fundamental interests of other human beings, including those 
who will belong to future generations, should take precedence over their own more 
trivial interests,  the world’s affluent populations must take drastic and immediate 
action to reduce their negative GHIs. 
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Notes  
 
1 One of the dictionary definitions of “to flourish” is “to be in good health” (Hawkins and Allen 1991, 541). 
2 Since Rees and Wackernagel included the areas needed for waste assimilation, emissions of carbon 
dioxide have been included, yet no other emissions. The relative weight of these emissions within one’s 
ecological footprint has been determined by the area of forest that would be required to assimilate those 
emissions, an approach that has been criticized not only because there are other ways in which carbon 
emissions could be sequestered, but also because subjective opinions might influence the used 
conversion rates (Van den Bergh and Verbruggen 1999). A similar problem underlies the calculation of the 
ecological footprint of nuclear energy, which has been “set at par with fossil fuel energy, for lack of a 
consensus on an alternate methodology” (Moran et al. 2009, 1943). In other words, it has been 
determined by the amount of land that would be required to offset the CO2-equivalent of nuclear energy. 
3 Rees (2006) refers to Catton (1980) for the concept of “overshoot.”  
4 A similar claim is made by Gerald Gaus, who argues that, “if (1) an accumulation of X-ing sets back other 
people’s interests, and if (2) the harm is serious enough such that its prevention warrants limiting the 
 36 
 
liberty to X (either by regulating or prohibiting X-ing), then (3) everyone should carry their fair share of the 
burden” (1999, 197). 
5 A similar point has been made by Maltais, yet it is my view that his call for “a new global political 
project” is necessary for a wide range of “global collective actions problems” (2008, 597) rather than just 
for problems related to climate change. 
